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IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF FULTON COUNTY 
STATE OF GEORGIA 













Civil Action File No. 2016-CV-273157 v. 
ALAN HENDRY, 
Defendants. 
ORDER ON PLAINTIFF MATTHEW CAMPBELL'S MOTION TO ENFORCE 
SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT 
This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff Matthew Campbell's Motion to Enforce 
Settlement Agreement. Upon consideration of the briefs submitted on the Motion and 
relevant case and statutory law on the matter, this Court finds as follows: 
Plaintiff Matthew Campbell ("Campbell") and Defendant Alan Hendry ("Hendry") 
each own 50% of Plaintiff SCM02, Inc. ("SCM02"), a company they operated together 
for over thirteen years. Unable to continue working together in a deadlocked 
environment, Campbell and Hendry began negotiations for Campbell to buyout 
Hendry's ownership interest in SCM02 in May 2015. Hendry accepted this first offer 
but also demanded certain tax treatment of the sale which was essential to his 
acceptance of the offer. Campbell backed out of the deal, initiating efforts to go through 
mediation. The three day mediation ultimately failed but brought the parties closer to 
resolution. Based on their discussions at mediation, Campbell presented to Hendry a 
Memorandum of Understanding ("MOU") dated February 22, 2016 and identified as an 
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"offer to purchase SCM02 shares." Campbell's email transmitting the MOU set an 
acceptance deadline of February 24, 2016. 
On February 29,2016, past the expiration of the offer, Hendry emailed Campbell 
stating: "I agree to your offer to purchase my shares at the price offered according to the 
attached." In response, Campbell sent an email on March 2,2016, agreeing to the 
terms Hendry sent, but adding "clarifications" to six provisions listed in the new MOU. 
While the MOU provided that Campbell's shares would be transferred to Hendry upon 
payment in full, Hendry's clarification provided that Campbell's shares would be held in 
trust until payment in full. Also, while the MOU provided that the purchase price would 
be based on retained earnings (estimated to be $535,000) and accounts receivable as 
of February 29,2016 (estimated as $601,000), Hendry clarified the accounts receivable 
would be paid from SCM02 as "ordinary income (1099)." Campbell asserts that this 
particular revision will cause him to accrue a tax liability of $166,000. In his affidavit, 
Hendry asserts he believed these clarifications were a counteroffer, not an acceptance 
of his offer. His affidavit also asserts that he emailed Campbell on March 9, 2016 to 
inform him the revisions were unacceptable-he intended to retain his shares until 
payment in full and would not agree to the increased tax liability-though this email is 
not before the Court. Campbell tendered payment to Hendry on March 31,2016 in the 
amount of $268,412.13, which he stated was 50% of the taxed retained earnings due 
under the March 2,2016 agreement. Based on the foregoing, the key issue is whether 
1 Both parties attach this email as an exhibit to their briefs. Campbell's version does not 
contain a copy of the MOU. Presumably, the copy of the MOU attached as an exhibit to 
Hendry's brief in opposition to the Motion contains Hendry's changes to the original 
MOU sent by Campbell. Either way, it seems as if both parties are considering 
Hendry's response as a counteroffer and the operative offer at issue in this Motion. 
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the parties formed a valid contract on March 2,2016, that is enforceable as a matter of 
law. 
Hendry argues Campbell's characterization of the purported agreement as a 
"settlement agreement" is inaccurate as the purported agreement pre-dated any legal 
action. Regardless, a motion to enforce a settlement agreement is analogous to the 
issues raised in a motion for summary judgment, requiring uncontested factual evidence 
indicating there is not a question of material fact. DeRossett Enters, Inc. v. General 
Elec. Capital Corp., 275 Ga. App. 728, 728 (2005). The evidence is viewed in the light 
most favorable to the nonmoving party. Id. To succeed, the movant must "show the 
court that the documents, affidavits, depositions and other evidence in the record reveal 
that there is no evidence sufficient to create a jury issue on at least one essential 
element." Id. (quoting Superglass Windshield Repair v. Mitchell, 233 Ga. App. 200 
(1998)). 
Likewise, a settlement agreement is a contract and must meet the same statutory 
requirements for contract formation and meeting of the minds. Id. at 729. To constitute 
a valid contract, there must be assent of the parties to the terms of the contract-a 
meeting of the minds on the essential terms. O.C.G.A. § 13-3-1; Great West Casualty 
Co. v. Bloomfield, 303 Ga. App. 26, 28 (2010). All material terms must be agreed upon 
at the time of formation or no meeting of the minds will exist. Jerry Dickerson Presents, 
Inc. v. Concert S Chastain Promotions, 260 Ga. App. 316, 328 (2003); see also 
O.C.G.A. § 13-3-2 ("until each [party] has assented to all the terms, there is no binding 
contract; until assented to, each party may withdraw his bid or proposition."). 
"Acceptance of an offer must be unconditional, unequivocal, and without variance of any 
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sort, otherwise, there can be no meeting of the minds and mutual assent necessary to 
formation of a contract." Panfel v. Boyd, 187 Ga. App. 639, 645-46 (1988). "The 
subsequent communication by one party to the contract to the other party 'varying only 
one term of the original offer' is a counteroffer." Id. (quoting Stubbs v. Tattnall Bank, 
244 Ga. 212, 213 (1979)). 
Whether a contract exists at all is a matter of fact. McKenna v. Capital Resource 
Partners, IV, LP, 286 Ga. App. 828, 832 (2007). When reviewing whether a contract 
was formed, the Court applies an objective theory of intent to determine whether the 
party knew he or she was agreeing the terms based on the surrounding circumstances. 
Id. Where extrinsic evidence, such as correspondence and discussion is disputed, the 
question of whether a party has assented to the contract is generally a matter for the 
jury. Id. 
Here, Hendry has presented sufficient evidence in opposition to this Motion to 
demonstrate there was no meeting of the minds on at least two material terms- 
whether Hendry would receive 50% of pre- or post-tax accounts receivable in exchange 
for his ownership interest in SCM02 and whether he would maintain his ownership 
interest until such time as he received full payment for that interest. Campbell's email 
on March 2, 2016 did not unconditionally accept Hendry's revised MOU. Instead 
Campbell added six "clarifications" and Hendry has presented evidence that at least two 
of these clarifications altered material terms of the offer. By changing the terms of the 
MOU, Campbell's March 2 email was a counteroffer, not a meeting of minds sufficient to 
form an enforceable contract. As such, Plaintiff's Motion to Enforce Settlement 
Agreement is DENIED. 
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50 ORDERED this ~ day of June, 2016. 
ALICE D. BONNER, SENIOR JUDGE 
Superior Court of Fulton County 
Atlanta Judicial Circuit 
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